Latin America has had striking changes in economic performance over time. None more striking 
Introduction
Consumption per-capita in the year 2004 was roughly the same as it was in 1980. Specifically, percapita consumption grew at a rate of 2.8% from 1950 to 1980, it then suffered a decline from 1980 to 1990 where it had a negative growth rate of −0.02%, and after 1990 it picked up again with a growth rate of 1.4%. More specifically, the model is a standard one-sided limited commitment model. The rest of the world acts as a lender and is fully committed, and there is a small open economy country that has limited commitment. The rest of the world has linear utility on the transfers that it receives from the small country, and faces an exogenously given stochastic discount factor. The business cycle fluctuations are driven by shocks to productivity of the small open economy, and shocks to the stochastic discount factor of the big country (the international interest rate). I study the planning problem that maximizes the weighted sum of the expected discounted utilities of the big and small country, subject to a participation constraint for the small country-which requires that in each period and state, allocations can be enforced only if their value is greater than it would be if they were relegated to autarky.
In the model, productivity shocks have two effects. In the short run, high productivity shocks make the participation constraint more binding because they make the value of autarky more attractive. In the long-run, a long sequence of low productivity shocks run consumption down until the participation constraint binds. Shocks to the stochastic discount factor have the same effect in the long and in the short-run. High shocks make the constraint more likely to bind because they increase the relative impatience of the small country.
Latin America has been experiencing a sequence of low productivity shocks since the 1980's, which explain the negative consumption growth until the 1990's through a looser participation constraint.
From 1990 on, there is a tighter participation constraint due to moderate international interest rate shocks, which explains the slow but positive growth.
Although the model is able to generate the behavior of aggregate consumption, it misses in a number of other aspects. When the participation constraint is introduced into the model, it endogenously generates two distortions. It distorts the relative wealth of the small country-the planner weight is time varying-, and it distorts the marginal product of capital-it generates an investment tax-. Implicitly, this time varying planner weight and the investment tax are driving the behavior of consumption, investment and net-exports. When the model fails to explain the data, it means that the planner weight and the investment tax generated by the model are not the correct ones.
Motivated by this, in the last section of the paper I take a more agnostic view at the problem.
Instead of letting these distortions arise endogenously, I introduce into the first-order conditions of the model, an exogenous time varying planer weight, an exogenous investment tax and an exogenous labor income tax. The first two distortions are directly comparable to the ones that are endogenously generated by the limited commitment model. The distortion to labor income is not present in the limited commitment model, but it is important to identify the relevance of labor market frictions for explaining Latin American data.
To identify these distortions I use a methodology that takes the business cycle accounting idea used by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007, [7] ) and extend it using recent Bayesian techniques for DSGE models.
I find that the planner weight generated by the limited commitment model behaves in a very similar way to that identified in the data. This result reinforces the idea that models with endogenous borrowing constraints are important for understanding the performance of the Latin American economy.
The tax to investment that arises from the limited commitment model does not coincide with the investment tax identified from the data. This result was expected given that the limited commitment model does not do a good job at matching investment data. Finally, I find that the labor wedge plays an important role in Latin America, specially before 1970. The limited commitment model does not generate any distortion on this margin so its not surprising that it is not able to fully capture the behavior of hours worked.
I follow the literature on international debt that relies on the willingness to pay as well as the literature on debt-constrained asset markets. On the international debt literature I follow, among others, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981, [11] ) where a debtor who defaults faces permanent exclusion from international capital markets, and Atkeson (1991, [4] ) who considers an environment where the participation constraint interacts with a moral hazard problem. The literature on debt-constrained asset markets has studied the theoretical implications of limited commitment constraints, but mostly in pure exchange, closed economy setups. This literature includes Kehoe and Levine (1993, [14] ), Kocherlakota (1996, [15] ) and Alvarez and Jermann (1996, [2] ).
Kehoe and Perri (2002, [13] ) go a step further and extend the work of Kehoe and Levine (1993, [14] ) and Kocherlakota (1996, [15] ), to a full-blown international business cycle model with production. They study business cycle co-movements across industrial countries. This paper is one of the few quantitative applications of these types of models. This paper follows Kehoe and Perri (2002, [13] ), I consider a two country production economy where market incompleteness arises endogenously. It is also closely related to Aguiar et al (Forthcoming, [1] ).
They consider a small open economy, where the government cannot commit to policy and seeks to insure a risk averse domestic constituency. The setup coincides in that the limited commitment is one-sided in the context of a small open economy. My paper differs in that the small open economy is subject to international interest rate shocks, which are represented by the stochastic discount factor, and labor supply is elastic.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the limited commitment model, Section 3 describes the methodology, Section 4 explains the model dynamics, Section 5 explains the calibration, Section 6 shows the results, Section 7 shows the business cycle accounting exercise, Section 8 compares the results of the limited commitment model with those of the business cycle accounting and the last section summarizes my findings.
The Limited Commitment Model
The economy is composed of a small open economy country, and a big country. The small country produces a good using domestic labor and capital, and production is subject to a country-specific productivity shock. Output is used for domestic consumption, domestic investment and to make a transfer of resources to the big country. This transfer can be positive or negative and can be interpreted as net-exports.
The big country has linear utility on the transfers received from the small country, and faces a stochastic discount factor which reflects the world interest rate. The business cycle fluctuations are driven by the country-specific productivity shock and by the stochastic discount factor for the big country.
Time is discrete and runs to infinity. In each period t, the state of the world, determined by the productivity and the stochastic discount factor shocks, s t is realized. I denote by s t = (s 0 , ..., s t ) the history of events up to and including period t. The probability of any particular history s t as of period 0, is given by π (s t ), and the initial realization s 0 is such that π (s 0 ) = 1. In period t, a good is produced in the small country using inputs of capital k(s t−1 ) and domestic labor h(s t ). Production is also affected by a productivity shock A(s t ) which follows an exogenous process. Output at history s t in the small country is given by
where F is a standard constant returns to scale production function. Consumers in the small country have preferences given by
where c (s t ) denotes consumption at s t andβ denotes the discount factor. The budget constraint of the small country is given by
where T (s t ) denotes the transfers made by the small country to the big country at s t and x (s t ) denotes investment at s t . Investment is determined by the capital-accumulation equation as follows
The big country on the other hand faces the following utility function
where
, and q (s t ) denotes the realization of the stochastic discount factor shock at s t . Note that the discount factor β t of the big country, differs from the discount factorβ t of the small country. This means that even when q (s t )
is at its unconditional mean, the big and the small country have different levels of impatience. This assumption will become important when the limited commitment is introduced.
In the absence of limited commitment the planner would maximize a weighted sum of the expected discounted utilities of the big and small country
subject to the budget constraint (3) and the capital accumulation constraint (4) of the small country.
Now consider an economy where there is limited commitment on the side of the small country.
In this case, apart from the budget and capital accumulation constraints, the small country faces a participation constraint. The participation constraint requires that at every point in time, the country prefers the allocation it receives by being in the contract and shipping T (s t ) units of output to the big country, to the allocation it could attain if it were in autarky from then on. The participation constraint is of the form
where π (s r |s t ) denotes the conditional probability of s r given s t , π (s t |s t ) = 1, and V A k s t−1 , s t denotes the value of autarky from s t onward. The value of autarky corresponds to the utility delivered by the following problem:
where r ≥ t, and k s r−1 is given.
In the context of limited commitment, the planner would maximize the weighted sum of the expected discounted utilities of the big and small country (6), subject to the participation constraint (7), the budget constraint (3) and the capital accumulation constraint (4) of the small country
subject to
Notice that the model with limited commitment has incomplete markets in the sense that there is a limit to the amount of contingent claims of a particular type that can be sold. The limit is determined by the amount the small country is willing to repay according to the participation constraint.
Methodology
Solving problem (8) can be complicated because it has an infinite number of enforcement constraints, which can have complicated binding patterns. Furthermore, given that consumption and leisure enter the current enforcement constraint, the standard dynamic programming approach cannot be used.
Kydland and Prescott (1980, [16] ) show that when this feature is present, the state space can be expanded to include an extra state variable, in this way the problem has a solution that is stationary in the new expanded state space. Marcet and Marimon (1999, [17] ) follow Kydland and Prescott (1980, [16] ) and extend their approach to different applications.
To solve the limited commitment model, I extend the recursive contract approach of Marcet and
Marimon (1999, [17] ) in a similar way to Kehoe and Perri (2002, [13] ). The added state variable is the current relative weight of the small country in the planning problem. Adding this state variable, and assuming that the shocks to productivity and the stochastic discount factor are Markovian, allows me to write a recursive problem.
I can write the Lagrangian for problem (8) as follows
denote the multipliers on the participation constraint.
Marcet and Marimon (1999, [17] ) point out that given that we know that π (s
then we can define
is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint.
Given this, the participation constraint can be written as
Hence, the Lagrangian can be re-written as
where M (s t ) is defined as the original planner weight for the small country µ, plus the sum of the past multipliers on the enforcement constraint along history s t .
The optimality conditions of the model are summarized by
and the complementary slackness condition. For computational convenience and following Kehoe and Perri (2002, [13] ), I normalize the multiplier and define v (s t ) = λ(s t ) M (s t ) . I also denote the right-hand side of equation (10) as
By doing this transformation I don't have to keep track of all past realizations of q. I just need a transition law forM (s t ) which determines its evolution. This transition equation is given bŷ
Using the normalization for the multiplier and (13), the first-order conditions can re-written and summarized by (11),M
instead of (10),
instead of (12), the transition law forM (s t ) and the complementary slackness conditions.
Note that (14) can be written in terms of consumption by using (15)
This substitution changes the nature of consumption within the model and transforms it from a control variable to a state variable. Hence the state is given by x t = c s t−1 , k s t−1 , s t , where
I assume that the underlying shocks for productivity A (s t ) and the stochastic discount factor q (s t )
are Markov. This assumption implies that the conditional probability π s t |s t−1 can be written as π s t |s t−1 , and the solution to the programming problem in (6) can be characterized recursively by policy rules for k (s t ) , c (s t ) , h (s t ) and υ (s t ), where the state is x t .
The policy rules satisfy the first-order conditions (11), (16) , (17) , the participation constraint (7) and the complementary slackness condition on the multiplier.
To calculate the policy functions I use a version of policy function iteration, and modify it to handle enforcement constraints in a similar way to Kehoe and Perri (2002, [13] ). Specifically, I define a grid X on the state space. I restrict the search to functions that take arbitrary values for every x ∈ X and are completely characterized over the state space when their value for every x ∈ X is identified.
I define a value function for each country. W (x) for the small country, and P (x) for the big country.
These value functions satisfy the first-order conditions (11), (16), (17), the participation constraint (7) and the complementary slackness condition on the multiplier, and are of the form
I start with the solution to the planner's problem when there is no limited commitment (6) . This guarantees that the initial value functions W 0 (x) and P 0 (x) are uniformly greater than or equal to the value of the true solution. This condition is needed for the algorithm to converge to the right solution.
Given the first-order conditions and the initial guess for labor, the normalized multiplier and the
To do so, I first assume that the participation constraint doesn't bind and find a set of allocations h, c , k . When the participation constraint doesn't bind υ = 0, and the the set of allocations has to satisfy (11),
and
After finding this set of allocations, I check if they satisfy the participation constraint
if they do then I define them to be the new set of allocations for x, and υ 1 (x) = 0. If they don't satisfy the participation constraint (22) then I solve for a set of allocations h, υ, c , k , that satisfy (11), (16), (17) and the participation constraint (22). This new set of allocations then becomes
Model dynamics
The dynamics of the model are driven by the effect that the productivity and stochastic discount factor shocks have on the participation constraint. Furthermore the dynamics of the model are different when the participation constraint is binding and when its not.
First assume that the constraint is not binding. This would imply that υ = 0, and from (17) and (27) we know
Asβ t β t q(s t ) < 1, the relative impatience of the small country leads to declining consumption. There is full insurance c (s t ) = c t . At the same time from (21), (27) and (23) we know 1 =β
and if
If the participation constraint is binding υ = 0. From (17) and (27) we know
Equation (25) states that there are two competing forces leading the long-run properties of consumption. Part A, represents the relative impatience of the small country and leads to declining consumption. Part B drives consumption up whenever the participation constraint binds.
The first order condition with respect to capital (16) includes the marginal product of capital tomorrow, and the expected impact of capital on next periods participation constraint. The expected impact of capital on next periods participation constraint, depends on the marginal value of tomorrows capital in autarky. Whenever the marginal value increases, autarky becomes more attractive and the participation constraint is more likely to bind. This term is analogous to an investment "wedge", see
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007, [7] ), which is isomorphic to a tax on investment.
Summarizing, consumption shrinks if the participation constraint does not bind; there is debt accumulation. If the participation constraint binds, the dynamics of consumption depend on the tightness of the constraint. History matters through c (s t ) and k (s t ).
2 Consumption (debt) dynamics drives capital dynamics. When consumption is low (high debt), the participation constraint is more 2 Unlike the endowment economy where history doesn't matter.
likely to bind and generate a higher investment tax. When consumption is high (low debt), the participation constraint is less likely to bind and the investment tax is lower.
In general the productivity shocks have two effects. In the short run, high productivity shocks make the constraint more binding because they make the value of autarky more attractive. In the long-run, a long sequence of low productivity shocks run consumption down until the participation constraint binds.
Shocks to the stochastic discount factor have the same effect in the long and in the short-run. High shocks make the constraint more likely to bind because they increase the relative impatience of the small country.
Finally, hours worked are determined by (11), (27) and (28)
independent of whether the constraint is binding or not.
Calibration and functional forms
The model has six structural parameters and six parameters describing the shocks. The structural parameters define the preferences, the production function and the capital accumulation equation.
I assume that the preferences of the small country are given by
and output is determined by a standard constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas production function
Table (1) summarizes the parameter values. I set α = 0.36, as is standard in the literature. ψ is set such that the level of hours worked in the model matches the data, and γ is set to one which is common in the literature. δ is set by the depreciation value generated by the first order condition with respect to capital in the the no limited commitment problem, when it is evaluated at the sample means of the data. I use aggregate annual data for consumption, investment, output and hours worked for all the main Latin American countries and generate a regional aggregate.
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The discount factor of the small country β is set to 0.90. The level of this parameter on its own is not that important. What really matters for the dynamics of the model is the relative impatience of the small country to the big country, the difference betweenβ and βq.
For the participation constraint to bind I needβ < βq. As the spread between the two discount factors increases, the participation constraint becomes tighter. I set β = 0.99, so that given an unconditional mean for q of 0.97 the expected value for βq becomes 0.96. An average discount factor of 0.96 implies an annual international interest rate of 4% which is close to the average rate of return on capital over the past hundred years.
In an unconstrained economy, the Euler equation is given by
and the interest rate (marginal product of capital) is equal to c(s t+1 ) βc(s t ) . The discount factor is the inverse of this object. For the calibration, I define the big country as an aggregate of the developed world. Mainly the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand. I collect consumption data for each country from OECD sources and generate an aggregate to calculate the inverse of consumption growth, which stands for the discount factor q.
I assume that the logarithm of the stochastic discount factor follows a standard autorregressive process of order one log (q t+1 ) = (1 − ρ q ) log (q ss ) + ρ q log (q t ) + σ q ε qt .
To estimate ρ q and σ q I use OLS, and find ρ q = 0.27 and σ q = 0.0134.
I recover the productivity shock by using the aggregate data on output, hours worked and investment for Latin America. I use the perpetual inventory method according to (4) to recover capital.
I assume that the logarithm of productivity follows a standard autorregressive process of order one
To estimate ρ A and σ A I use OLS, and find ρ A = 0.99 and σ A = 0.025.
In order to solve the model, I have to discretize the stochastic discount factor and productivity shocks. To do so, I follow the methodology suggested by Tauchen and Hussey (1991). I discretize A to 5 states and q to 3 states, for a total of 15 states.
Results
This section, compares the model generated data with observed data for Latin America. The observed data is constructed as was mentioned in the calibration section, and corresponds to aggregate variables.
The model generated data is stationary by definition. To compare it with the observed data I add a 2% trend. The fact that the model overestimates per-capita hours worked during the first half of the period, offsets the low capital generated by the model during this same time. Hence, the model does a decent job at explaining output during the first half of the sample. After the mid 1970's, the model underestimates output. This is due to the low investment, given that during this period the model matches the level of per-capita hours worked pretty well.
The third panel of Figure 3 shows the comparison for net-exports. At a first glance it might seem like the model misses in this dimension. But there are several things to take into account. There is no reason to think that the model should do a good job at matching net exports before 1970. We know that Latin American economies had inward looking policies during this time. The model is able to generate the sharp reversal of capital flows around 1980-although it comes a little sooner than it does in the data-but the model is not able to capture the prolongation of the debt crisis. This is expected because in the model the intent to default is corrected immediately, while in reality we know that the debt crisis took around a decade to overcome.
To further understand the behavior of net-exports in the model, it is important to understand the behavior of the participation constraint. Figure 4 shows the behavior of the normalized multiplier υ, given the behavior of the stochastic discount factor and productivity shocks which are shown in Figure   5 . A positive υ means that the constraint is binding and a υ = 0 means that the constraint is not biding. Oscillations in between show how the constraint tightens or relaxes.
The constraint is binding until 1977, due to both high productivity shocks and moderate stochastic discount factor shocks. We know that in this types of models, there are capital inflows only when the constraint is not binding and debt is being accumulated, hence before 1977 the model generates positive net-exports, and only until 1977 that the constraint relaxes there are capital inflows (negative net-exports). Immediately after this, in 1980 a high productivity shock hits together with a high stochastic discount factor shock making the constraint bind and net-exports become positive. This situation changes after 1984 because the stochastic discount factor shock goes back to around its This exercise will show us the importance of each of the shocks for the model dynamics. Figure 6 shows what happens when the productivity shock is set to its unconditional mean and only the stochastic discount factor shocks are feeded into the model. The first sub-plot shows aggregate consumption in the data (blue solid line) and aggregate consumption generated by the model (dashed green line). The second sub-plot shows the behavior of the normalized multiplier υ. Notice that the stochastic discount factor is not the shock that is generating the drop in consumption observed in the 80's. This results show that productivity is crucial for explaining the behavior of consumption in Latin America.
Overall, we learn several things from this exercise. We learn that a limited commitment model like the one presented above is able to generate the observed behavior of Latin American consumption after 1980. We learn that the model over estimates per-capita hours worked during the first twenty years of the sample and that it under estimates investment for most of the period. Given that it misses on capital it also misses on output after the 1970's. We know that the model misses on capital because it endogenously generates an investment tax which is presumably too high.
Finally the model misses in net-exports because it can't account for the fact that Latin America was a fairly closed economy until the 70's, and it can't account for the actual duration of the debt crisis.
Given that the model misses in these dimensions, I am going to take a more agnostic view of the problem and in the next section I'm going to propose a methodology that will help me figure out what other frictions that are absent in this model are important for explaining the Latin American data. [7] ). In the close economy dimension, apart from the stochastic productivity, I introduce stochastic population, government spending and two distortions to household's efficiency conditions. One distortion is isomorphic to a labor income tax in the labor/leisure choice, the other distortion is isomorphic to a capital income tax in the Euler equation. This last distortion can be mapped into the investment "tax" that arises in the limited commitment model when the participation constraint tightens.
A diagnostic tool
In the open economy dimension I introduce shocks to the planner Pareto weights in the spirit of Ohanian et al (2009, [19] ). The planner weight in this model is equivalent to the planner weight that arises endogenously in the limited commitment mode and that I denote by M (s t ).
To solve the model and recover the wedges I use a methodology that takes the business cycle accounting idea used by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007, [7] ) and extend it using resent Bayesian techniques for DSGE models. There are three main differences between their approach and mine. 
The model economy
The model is the one presented in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992, [5] ) augmented by "wedges" in the spirit of Cole and Ohanian (2002, [10] ) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007, [7] ).
Apart from stochastic productivity, the model has stochastic population, government spending and two distortions to household's efficiency conditions. The first distortion is between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor. This distortion is isomorphic to a labor income tax and from now on I will refer to it as the labor wedge. The second distortion to the household's efficiency conditions distorts the Euler equation and is isomorphic to a tax on investment, from now on I will refer to this distortion as the investment wedge.
In the open economy dimension of the model I introduce a distortion to the relative consumption between countries. I do so by introducing time varying Pareto weights in the spirit of Ohanian et al (2009, [19] ).
Consider a world populated by two countries, "Latin America" and the "Rest of the World". They are indexed by j. The planner maximizes the sum of the weighted expected discounted utility of the two regions, subject to the aggregate resource constraint and capital accumulation constraint:
where C jt , I jt , K jt denote consumption, investment and capital for country j. h jt denotes labor and N jt denotes population. A jt denotes productivity or the efficiency wedge, G jt represents the government wedge, τ ljt is the labor wedge, τ kjt is the capital wedge and χ jt is the planner's Pareto weight for country j. The last term of the capital accumulation constraint is an investment adjustment cost. Introducing adjustment costs to investment is a common practice to decrease investment volatility which is known to be very high in this type of model.
I assume that population and productivity in the "Rest of the World" are non-stationary and follow a random walk:
where a Rss and n Rss are the mean growth rates of productivity and population in the "Rest of the World". All the other shocks are assumed to be stationary and follow first-order autoregressive processes.
where g jt is the fraction of GDP consumed by the government in region j.
The reason for assuming random walks for the productivity and population of the "Rest of the World" is the following. In the data real output, consumption and investment are non-stationary. To make the data comparable to the model, the business cycle literature commonly uses the HodrickPrescott (HP) filter. However, Cogley and Nason (1995, [9] ) and Canova (1998, [6] ) show that the use of the filter introduces significant biases into the data by amplifying business-cycle frequencies even if it does not have any. To avoid using any kind of filter I follow the approach presented in Fernandez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2006, [12] ). I assume random walks for productivity and population which are commonly thought to be extremely persistent, and detrend the model with respect to a pair of nonstationary trends.
From equations (31), (32) and the optimality conditions of the model we can see that all variables grow at a factor a In terms of the productivity and population processes of "Latin America", I assume that there is a common trend for the two regions, and define:
where a L and n L are stationary and represent the domestic component of productivity and population in Latin America. They follow first-order autoregressive processes.
log (a Lt ) = (1 − ρ aL ) log (a Lss ) + ρ aL log (a Lt−1 ) + σ aL ε aLt log (n Lt ) = (1 − ρ nL ) log (n Lss ) + ρ nL log (n Lt−1 ) + σ nL ε nLt
The residuals for all the shocks are distributed normal with zero mean and variance equal to one.
Given that
A Rt A Rt−1 = a Rt , when the model is detrended A Lt = a Lt a Rt , which is stationary.
Methodology: calibration and estimation
The model has 9 structural parameters and 33 parameters that characterize the wedges. I calibrate the structural parameters and the steady state levels of the wedges. Table 2 summarizes most of the calibrated structural parameters. The steady state for the productivities, population and government spending processes is set to their sample means.
Notice that the planner weight of Latin America relative to that of the rest of the world can be pinned down directly from the data, and in equilibrium it is equal to the ratio of consumptions between regions. I normalize the planner weight of Latin America with respect to the rest of the world such that there is only one planner weight for Latin America. χ Lss is set equal to its sample mean.
The autoregressive processes for productivity and population are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares.
To estimate the rest of the parameters that characterize the wedges, I log-linearize the model around the steady state and use a standard decomposition technique to obtain the state space representation.
I apply the Kalman-Filter to calculate the likelihood and recover the wedges. I use Bayesian methods to find the unknown parameters (see An and Schorfheide (2007, [3] )). Latin America includes all the main countries, and the rest of the World is the rest of the world except for Africa and those countries that were or are not market economies. The data for the rest of the World and Latin America comes from OECD sources, the World Bank Global Development Indicators and other country specific sources.
To be able to estimate the model I need to add a measurement equation for every variable that we observe. This means that I need to add five measurement equations per region, corresponding to output, consumption, hours, investment and population, and one more for Latin America that corresponds to net-exports. Notice that I do not use data on government spending, this means that G jt acts as a residual and wont necessarily look as in the data.
Alternatively, I could throw the measurement error into net-exports by using data on government spending. I choose to use data on net-exports and not government spending because I'm interested in the behavior of capital markets. By using net-export data, I guarantee that the model will reproduce the observed capital flows of these two regions 4 .
I have eleven stochastic processes 5 and seventeen data series 6 for a system that is perfectly identified. Table 3 in the Appendix for a summary of the estimated parameters.
Note that the efficiency wedge, the labor wedge and the relative planner weight can be calculated directly from the data by using the production function, the labor/leisure condition and the optimality conditions for consumption. But it is not possible to recover the investment wedge directly from the data because the Euler condition is a forward-looking equation. This is why I use the Kalman filter to recover the smoothed estimates of the innovations to the wedges. Instead of using the Kalman filter, I could iterate over the solution of the model until I find a fixed point. I do not use this alternative because it is more complicated than just using the filter, and by construction, the wedges obtained through the Kalman filter, are the same as the ones obtained by using the static optimality conditions of the model and iterating over the solution to recover the investment wedge.
Recovered wedges
In this section, I show the recovered wedges that are relevant for understanding the dimensions in which the limited commitment model is missing. Figure 8 shows the behavior of productivity, labor wedge, investment wedge and relative planner weight.
The productivity or efficiency wedge recovered with this methodology is equal to the solow residual calculated using the production function. The productivity that is feeded into the limited commitment model and that is showed in Figure 5 , is just the detrended version of the series shown in Figure 8 .
The last panel in Figure 8 shows The third panel of Figure 8 shows the investment wedge. An investment wedge that is greater than one represents a tax. The diagnostic model says that Latin America's tax on investment increased until the mid 70's and then decreased.
Finally, the second panel in Figure 8 shows the behavior of the labor wedge. When the wedge is less than one it can be interpreted as a tax on labor income. The labor wedge states that Latin America had an increasing labor tax until 1970 and that after that period it started declining. The period from 1950 to 1970, is exactly where the limited commitment model misses the sharp decrease in per-capita hours worked that is observed in the data. Hence introducing a distortion to the labor/leisure condition should improve the ability to the limited commitment model to match the data on hours worked. Although the model is able to generate the behavior of aggregate consumption, it misses in a number of other aspects. Given that the model misses in these dimensions, I propose a methodology [7] ) and extend it using recent Bayesian techniques for DSGE models.
I find that the planner weight generated by the limited commitment model behaves in a very similar way to that in the diagnostic model. This result reinforces the idea that models with endogenous borrowing constraints are important for understanding the performance of the Latin American economy.
The tax to investment that arises from the limited commitment model is different from the investment tax that arises from the diagnostic model. This result was expected given that the limited commitment model does not do a good job at matching investment data. Finally, I find that the labor wedge plays an important role in Latin America. The limited commitment model does not generate any distortion in this margin so its not surprising that it is not able to fully capture the behavior of hours worked.
To summarize, this paper shows that a limited commitment model with domestic productivity shocks and international interest rate shocks is able to explain the behavior of Latin American consumption for the past 30 years. For the model to be able to explain the whole pattern of net exports, output, capital and hours worked for the same period, it would have to generate a different investment tax and have a distortion to the labor/leisure margin. 
